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PSYCHOSOMATICS AND JUDICIAL SEPARATIONS
EMILY MARXt
Psychosomatic experiments now being conducted at the Cornell University
Medical College and the New York Hospital may have as profound an effect
on the "cruel and inhuman" phase of judicial separations in New York as
blood-grouping tests have had on paternity proceedings and the issue of
adultery in divorce actions. Upon proof that the blood-grouping tests were
competently and accurately made, their definite exclusion of paternity must
today be accepted by the trial court as conclusive proof of nonpaternity,
irrespective of the overwhelming non-scientific testimony to the contrary.'
They may be ordered to determine the questioned legitimacy of a child born
during wedlock 2 and, if they show definite exclusion, will overcome one of
the oldest, strongest and most persuasive presumptions know to the law.8
The Cornell experiments are producing equally irrefutable scientific proof of
facts pertinent to actions for judicial separations 4 and now determined by
haphazard conjecture and emotional reaction of the courts, as were paternity
and legitimacy before recognition of the value of the blood-grouping tests.8
The New York statute provides that a judicial separation shall be granted
to the spouse who has been exposed to "cruel and inhuman treatment" which
renders continued cohabitation "unsafe and improper."8 The basic question
in such actions is whether the physical or mental health of the plaintiff is
being seriously affected by the acts of cruelty alleged. Neither spouse need
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Commissioner of Welfare v. Costonie, 277 App. Div. 90, 97 N.Y. S. 2d 804 (1st Dep't
1950); Cuneo v. Cuneo, 198 Misc. 240, 96 N.Y. S. 2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Jordan v.
Mace, 69 A. 2d 670 (Me. 1949) ; Commonwealth v. Zamarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931).
Stronger lay evidence of paternity than that presented to the trial court in Commissioner
of Welfare v. Costonie is difficult to conceive. The defendant signed a written acknowledg-
ment of paternity, admitted sex relations with the child's mother during a period of 16
years, paid in full for her confinement, brought mother and child home from the maternity
hospital and supplied both with rent and food even during the trial. Schatkin, Judicial
Acceptance of Blood Tests, 124 N.Y.L.J. 12, col. 1 (July 5, 1950).
2. Kwartler v. Kwartler, 291 N.Y. 689, 52 N.E.2d 588 (1943); Matter of Lentz, 247
App. Div. 31, 34, 283 N.Y. Supp. 749, 751 (2d Dep't 1935); D'Agostino v. D'Agostlno,
173 Misc. 312, 17 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Matter of Swahn, 158 Misc. 17, 285
N.Y. Supp. 234 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Anthony v. Anthony, 9 N.J. Super. 411 (1950).
3. Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D. C. Cir. 1940); Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc, 667, 71
N. Y. S. 2d 797 (Doam. ReL Ct. 1947) ; Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
4. Proposed uniform marriage and divorce legislation includes "cruel and inhuman treat-
ment" as a ground for absolute divorce. It is presently a ground for judicial separation
or for divorce in 42 states. LEGAL STATus or Wommq iN Tnu U.S.A. 63 (1942).
5. Sympathy for the complainant and prejudice against the respondent frequently result
in a jury finding of paternity in the face of blood-grouping tests definitely establishing
impossibility of paternity, where such tests are not given conclusive effect by the courts.
Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 453 (1946).
6. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1161.
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sacrifice his or her body or mind to the marriage or expose himself or herself
to continued infliction of serious physical or mental pain. In the absence
of reliable scientific apparatus for determining the effect upon body or mind
of the acts complained of, our courts have adopted certain rules of thumb.
Actual physical blows against the plaintiff's body or threats by the defendant
of such bodily harm accompanied by menacing gestures satisfy the statute.
Thus a judicial separation has been granted against a husband who came home
grossly intoxicated, threatened his wife with a loaded revolver, seized her
person and threatened to put her head into a stove, pinching and bruising her
in the struggle; 7 against a wife who ratified the actions of her daughter in
striking the plaintiff on four different occasions, once with an earthen crock,
causing physical injuries for which he needed some medical attention; 8 against
a wife who assaulted her husband with knives on at least two occasions and
bit him, drawing blood; 9 against a husband who kicked, beat and struck
his wife during her pregnancy and on other occasions.1 0 But a war of words be-
tween the spouses, no matter how acrimonious or prolonged, does not entitle either
to a judicial separation. Verbal bickerings and quarrels are deemed to be
proof only of "incompatibility of temper"; they are not grounds for a decree
of separation in New York"1 since "their natural purpose and effect
is neither to injure health nor to endanger reason."'-' They fall within the
rule de minimis non curat lex and are dismissed by the courts as a mere incident
of married life. They are held incapable as a matter of law of seriously
affecting health or permanently impairing it.P3 But if the verbal barrage is
accompanied by an affirmative act, wantonly or intentionally done, which
causes physical or mental suffering-bodily harm demonstrable to the court-
a judicial separation will be granted for "cruel and inhuman" treatment. Thus
a separation was granted to a wife who claimed that her health was impaired
by her husband's excessive and unreasonable sexual indulgences; 14 to a
physician-husband who was publicly accused by his nagging wife of unchastity
7. Oltmann v. Oltmann, 236 App. Div. 817, 259 N.Y. Supp. 984 (2d Dep't 1932).
8. Bergman v. Bergman, 138 Misc. 335, 245 N.Y. Supp. 439 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
9. Weiner v. Weiner, 289 N.Y. 812, 47 N.E.2d 53 (1943), affirming, 264 App. Div. 538,
35 N.Y.S.2d 8654 (1st Dep't 1942).
10. Waltermire v. Waltermire, 268 App. Div. 810, 48 N.Y.S.2d 499 (3d Dep't 1944).
11. Berg v. Berg, 289 N.Y. 513, 46 N.E.2d 910 (1943); Smith v. Smith, 273 N.Y.
380, 383, 7 N.E.2d 272, 274 (1937); Gabriel v. Gabriel, 274 App. Div. 141, 142, 79
N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (Ist Dep't 1948); Morris v. Morris, 260 App. Div. 6, 20 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1st Dep't 1940) ; Greene v. Greene, 244 App. Div. 219, 278 N.Y. Supp. 954 (Ist Dep't
1935); Strnad v. Strnad, 238 App. Div. 572, 266 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Ist Dep't 1933).
12. Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N.Y. 141, 148, 129 N.E. 349, 351 (1920). A wife who
leaves her husband because of the bickerings will have a judicial separation decreed against
'her on her husband's complaint for unjustifiable abandonment. Berg v. Berg, supra note 11.
And vice versa. Avdoyan v. Avdoyan, 265 App. Div. 763, 40 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1st Dep't
1943).
13. Avdoyan v. Avdoyan, supra note 12.
14. Harnish v. Harnish, 270 App. Div. 799, 60 N.Y.S.2d 153 (4th Dep't 1946).
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with his women patients; 1 ' to a wife who was once forcibly thrown on the
floor injuring her arms and back, after 30 years of married life marked by
20 years of bickerings; 16 to a wife whose mother-in-law had full charge of the
marital household and treated her with contempt and ridicule.1 7 Acts which
are not reputed to cause physical or mental suffering fall within the de minimis
classification, although the plaintiff may present medical testimony of result-
ing nervous tension. Thus a separation was denied to a wife whose husband
did not speak to her for lengthy periods and smoked in her presence although
she was suffering from asthma to his knowledge; 18 to a wife whose husband
accused her in cables and letters of selfishness, disloyalty and disregard for
her marital duties; 1 9 to a husband whose wife attempted suicide in his
presence and by her displays of temper caused him to make a similar attempt.2 0
Even acts which concededly fall within the "cruel and inhuman" category
will not support a decree of judicial separation if the injured spouse was able
to endure his physical and mental suffering sufficiently to remain under the
marital roof.2 '
Physical or mental harm, either actual or imminent, from continued
cohabitation must be shown by the spouse seeking the decree of separation.
In the absence of proof of an actual or threatened physical blow, the plaintiff
must be able to point to some affirmative act of such a character as to persuade
the court that his health is thereby being seriously affected and probably will
be permanently impaired.22 Although the point in controversy is the actual
or imminent physical and mental condition of the plaintiff, physical examinations
are never requested in such litigations. And yet the inherent power of the court
to order "such a medical examination as may be necessary to ascertain the facts
requisite to a correct decision of the cause" in matrimonial actions, is well-
established . 3 "The interest which the public, as well as the parties, have
15. Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N.Y. 141, 129 N.E. 349 (1920).
16. Jury v. Jury, 242 App. Div. 476, 275 N.Y. Supp. 586 (4th Dep't 1934).
17. Ammermuller v. Ammermuller, 249 App. Div. 609, 292 N.Y. Supp. 177 (1st Dep't
1936), affirming, 157 Misc. 75, 282 N.Y. Supp. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
18. Reider v. Reider, 228 App. Div. 334, 239 N. Y. Supp. 508 (1st Dep't 1930).
19. Treherne-Thomas v. Treherne-Thomas, 178 Misc. 634, 35 N.Y. S. 2d 619 (Sup. Ct.
1942).
20. Avdoyan v. Avdoyan, 265 App. Div. 763, 40 N.Y. S. 2d 665 (1st Dep't 1943).
21. Berman v. Berman, 277 App. Div. 560, 101 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1950).
22. Avdoyan v. Avdoyan, 265 App. Div. 763, 766, 40 N.Y. S. 2d 665, 668 (1st Dep't
1943).
23. Trovato v. Trovato, 262 App. Div. 276, 277, 28 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (1st Dep't 1941).
See also White v. White, 255 App. Div. 718, 6 N.Y. S. 2d 512 (2d Dep't 1938) ; Lamour v.
Lamour, 251 App. Div. 725, 295 N.Y. Supp. 513 (2d Dep't 1937); Galligano v. Galligano,
245 App. Div. 743, 280 N.Y. Supp. 419 (2d Dep't 1935) ; DeNisco v. DeNisco, 125 N. Y. L. J.
483, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 1951) (physical examination of husband ordered on application
to hold him in contempt for nonpayment of alimony) ; Yelin v. Yelin, 142 Misc. 533, 535,
255 N.Y. Supp. 708, 710 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Cowen v. Cowen, 125 Misc. 755, 211 N.Y. Supp.
840 (Sup. Ct. 1925); LeBarron v. LeBarron, 35 Vt. 365 (1862). In the federal courts,
physical examinations may be ordered in all actions in which the physical or mental
condition of a party is in controversy. FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (a).
(Vol. 20
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in the question of upholding or dissolving the marriage state" compels the court
to order a physical examination of its own motion when the matrimonial
litigation before it depends on facts not otherwise ascertainable2 4 i.e., the
physical condition of the parties, as to which "nature has provided no other
means" of proof.25 Such facts the Cornell experiments disclose. In personal
injury actions it has long been recognized that serious bodily ailments are
those which affect the internal organs of the body, that severe pain is that
which results from an internal injury. The body blow which is accepted as
conclusive proof of physical injury in separation actions would receive short
shrift in personal injury litigations unless accompanied by proof of resulting in-
ternal damage. The acts of humiliation and ridicule which are sometimes accepted
as sufficient ground for a decree of separation endanger health only to the extent
that they affect the internal nervous system and vital organs. A defendant charged
with monetary liability for inflicting similar injuries is automatically granted
a physical examination of the plaintiff and is not required to accept the latter's
recital of his symptoms-known to be exaggerated, especially when litigation
is in hand, and of doubtful, if any, value in the proof of internal injuries.-0
It would thus seem self-evident that we need to look within the body, to
examine the internal organs of the allegedly cruelly-treated plaintiff, before we
can know whether there has been a physical or mental injury serious enough to
warrant disruption of the marital status by judicial decree. 7 Without an in-
ternal examination, the court can know no more concerning the state of the
plaintiff's health than it does about a party's impotency, tuberculosis or venereal
disease, on which it has repeatedly refused to make any finding in the absence
of a physician's examination because it deems itself "impotent" to act on
matters which a layman can know only by hearsay.2  Such internal exami-
nations will disclose that we are as mistaken in accepting non-scientific testi-
mony to prove cruel and inhuman treatment as we were in accepting such testi-
mony to prove paternity and legitimacy. The scientific facts disclosed by the
24. McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 129 N. Y. 50, 54, 29 N. E. 235, 236
(1891), quoting from Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 241 U. S. 250, 252 (1891);
Gore v. Gore, 103 App. Div. 168, 169, 93 N.Y. Supp. 396, 397 (3d Dep't 1905); Anony-
mous v. Anonymous, 69 Misc. 489, 491, 126 N.Y. Supp. 149, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1910). The
ordered examination may include insertion of instruments into the body and whatever tests
are necessary to determine the state of the litigant's health. Hayt v. Brewster, Gordon &
Co., 199 App. Div. 68, 72, 191 N.Y. Supp. 176, 179 (4th Dep't 1921).
25. Briggs v. Morgan, 3 PhilL Eccl. 325, 330, 161 Eng. Rev. 1339, 1341 (1820), quoted
in Anonymous v. Anonymous, 69 AMisc. 489, 491, 126 N.Y. Supp. 149, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
26. BRA-roy AND KAN, TRAuAm. AND DISEASE 21 (2d ed. 1941).
27. The only evidence acceptable to the old Court of Chancery in annulment actions for
impotency was that disclosed by a physical examination of the defendant conducted by
surgeons appointed by the court. Cahn v. Cahn, 21 Misc. 506, 4S N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1897); Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige 25 (N.Y. 1841); Devanbagh v. Devanbagb, S Paige
554 (N.Y. 1836).




Cornell experiments require us to reexamine the conclusive effect given to physi-
cal blows and the cavalierness with which we treat the war of words; and
possibly to alter our premise that it is the successful plaintiff who is the actual
or potential sufferer and the one whose health needs judicial protection.
Emotional stresses and disturbances are perceived by one or more of the
body's internal organs, glands, circulatory system and airways. These structures
become either overactive or underactive. With proper apparatus their ab-
normal functioning can be detected and even photographed. Just as the ex-
ternal limbs of the body mobilize to ward off physical assaults, so do the internal
viscera battle against emotional assaults. The only external evidence of the
internal fight against emotional assaults may be occasional physical blows or
torrents of ill-tempered words, as the body "lets off steam" and temporarily
relieves the affected organs of the tensions to which they have been reacting
by abnormal behavior.29 These external manifestations will be directed against
the persons closest at hand. Being unreasoned and quasi-reflex, they are not
directed solely to the persons or situations which produced the emotional stress.
In fact, the individual whose viscera are suffering from the emotional assaults
upon him may be unaware that he is being thus assaulted. 0 Usually he is
grossly mistaken as to the source of the stresses of which he is aware.
Consequently, the parties to a separation action for cruel and inhuman
conduct are seldom in agreement on the causes of the marital dispute. Each
honestly believes the other is to blame and protests that the acts complained
of occurred involuntarily and only in retaliation to the other's misbehavior.
As far as the health of the spouses is concerned, the Cornell experiments
require the conclusion that the defendant who delivered the physical blow
for which a judicial separation is .sought is often the one most seriously ill.
Long before the blow has been struck, the defendant's stomach, intestines,
heart, blood vessels or airways may have become diseased in a desperate at-
tempt to counteract an emotional stress engendered by events having no relation
to his marital status or marital partner. Dissatisfaction with his occupation,
resentment against his immediate superior may have caused hyperfunctioning
of one or more of his internal organs. It may be his stomach that incessantly
churns and secretes destructive acids intended only for digestion of food, until
its membrane lining becomes fragile, tears and develops peptic .ulcers.81 Or it
may be his intestines that become overactive until their membrane lining
develops lesions and bleeding ulcers.82 Or it may be his heart and blood vessels
29. LMrx STaMSS AND BoDmY. DisEAsa 1066 (1950), published by the Association for Re-,
search in Nervous and Mental Diseases. This volume contains detailed reports prepared by
132 experts in the field, amply supporting the conclusions herein stated.
30. The problem of the physician in these cases is to discover the type of situations to
which the individual under examination reacts by over or under functioning of his internal
organs and to induce him to alter the importance and significance he currently gives to the
problems falling within that type or category. Id. at 1079. When the irritant Is neither
the personality of his spouse nor the marital status, it seems clear that a judicial separation
is wholly unnecessary as well as irrelevant.
31. Id. at 647-76, 1064.
32. Id. at 679-97, 1065.
[Vol. 20
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that react to his feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment by continuously
functioning as during periods of physical exercise, until his heart becomes
structurally diseased, his blood pressure reaches abnormal heights, his kidneys
fail to perform their function and his breathing becomes labored.p Or it may
be his skeletal muscles that contract and remain contracted, producing severe
headaches, backaches, sustained muscle cramps.3 4 Or it may be his nasal cav-
ities and air passages that become engorged to the point of obstruction, resulting
in hay fever, asthma and sinus abnormalities.ns Inability to cope with his
workaday problems, feelings of helplessness against overwhelming odds may
have caused hypofunctioning of one or more of his internal organs with equally
disastrous internal effect. Nausea, vomiting, belching are some of the results
when the stomach is the reacting organ.30 Constipation and inability to elimi-
nate waste matter from the body is the result when the intestines take over his
feelings of futility, dejection and useless striving. 7 The external physical blow
against his spouse will momentarily relieve these diseased internal organs from
the tensions which have caused them to behave abnormally and become
diseased3 But that blow is irrelevant to a determination of the striker's
disposition, attitude toward his spouse and probability of future blows.
The outstanding characteristic of many individuals whose bodies react to
their feelings of resentment and hatred in the form of hyperactivity of their
internal organs is an outward calm, serenity and sweetmanneredness while their
inners bear the brunt of the hostility they feel.39 Their overall marital behavior
is frequently exemplary.4° Their occasional body blow against others is akin
to the wild striking by a drowning man of his rescuer. When the victim has
been safely brought ashore, he may aim a few more blows at those around him
until his water-logged body returns to its normal state. The defendant in a
separation action may act similarly until his diseased internal organs again
function normally. A judicial separation is the curative agent only in those rare
instances in which the spouse or the marital status was the emotional stress
which caused the internal disease. Where dissatisfaction with employment or
with self4 ' is the causative stress, the decree of separation will not only fail to
cure the diseased organs but may aggravate the disorder. On the other hand,
the spouse against whom the blow was delivered may be internally healthy
33. Id. at 799-817, 870-80, 1068-71.
34. Id. at 609-14, 750-52, 1066-7.
35. Id. at 545-601, 1075, 1082.
36. Id. at 1065-6.
37. Id. at 724-31, 1067-8.
38. Intestinal lesions disappeared when the individual under physical examination gave
vent to his feelings of resentment and hostility. Id. at 683-4.
39. Id. at 1065, 1087.
40. Smith v. Smith, 273 N.Y. 380, 384, 7 N.E.2d 272, 274 (1937); jury v. jury, 242
App. Div. 476, 477, 275 N.Y. Supp. 586, 587 (4th Dep't 1934).
41. 'ack of a reference point," absence of "focus" and ultimate goal for the activities
of the individual is the basic cause of his psychosomatic ills, in the opinion of Harold G.
Wolff, the leading scientific experimenter and authority in the field of psychosOimatics in
the United States, under whose direction the Cornell experiments were conducted. Lim
STREss Amw Bonny DrSEAsE 1088 (1950).
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and, with medical guidance, able to cure42 the diseased defendant; or may even
be the generator of the stresses which caused the disease and thus indirectly
of the physical blow complained of, and therefore the one actually at fault.
To a court charged primarily with upholding the marital status, evidence of
the external behavior of the defendant's limbs should be unacceptable as basis
for a decree of separation. It should demand and receive, through physical
examinations, scientific evidence of the etiology of the external blow, of the
internal behavior of the defendant's vital organs and of their diseased condition
if they behave abnormally and were the unwitting cause of the blow; and
scientific confirmation that the physical blow for which the plaintiff seeks the
separation-if an isolated occurrence as it frequently is-has done more than
superficial damage to his body. Without such scientific evidence, it will sepa-
rate the spouses because the defendant's employer mistreats him or his war
service destroyed his prior sense of values and left him without a goal.48
Without such scientific evidence it does not know-as it must-that the
plaintiff's health or mind is being endangered and that the defendant is assault
prone.
Medically there is little generative difference between the physical blow of
the spouse whose stomach is being ulcerated by continued exposure to emo-
tional stress and his verbal bickerings. Medically such bickerings may cause
serious internal injury to the spouse against whom they are directed and may
prove fatal if prolonged. Only an internal examination can determine whether
in fact the bickerings are more "cruel and inhuman" to the addressee than the
visible physical blow. Stomach ulcers, intestinal bleeding, asthma, migraine
headaches, heart damage may be the result of the war of words which the court
presently treats as too trivial to merit serious consideration. The Cornell experi-
ments have shown beyond possible doubt that "insulting and angry words,"
irrespective of the intent of the speaker, may permanently injure health and
may result in death by causing internal organs of the addressee to destroy
themselves in a vain attempt to fight against the hostile words.
The same public policy which makes the State a party to all marriages and
vitally concerned in their non-disruption requires the court to avail itself of
the scientific approach to the judicial separation for cruel and inhuman treat-
ment. If the marital disturbances are allegedly endangering health, it should
determine by expert testimony based on physical examinations whose health
is being adversely affected and grant judgment accordingly. Whether the mari-
tal disturbance manifests itself in physical blows or in a war of words should
not be the determinant of the grant or denial of a decree. The question would
seem to be whether there is an ascertainable cause for the behavior of the
spouses which can be eliminated without danger to their health or quasi-
termination of their marriage.
42. Cure does not require a removal of the cause but the substitution of new credits--
"self respect, satisfaction from activities, belief in himself, his potential and in those about
him." Id. at 1090.
43. The trial court must determine "the basis of the differences" between the spouses
and "the question of fault for the matrimonial rift. " agger v. Jagger, 274 App. Dive
785, 786, 79 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (1st Dep't 1948).
(Vol. 20
